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I. INTRODUCTION
All men are created equal, except aerospace workers. This was not how the
Declaration of Independence was written, but it is how the U.S. government is
currently enforcing its aerospace-related export control restrictions. Specifically,
*
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Office and as Corporate Counsel since 2003. In this capacity, Mr. Gold has overseen and been
responsible for export control compliance for the company’s primary interactions with foreign
parties. More specifically, Mr. Gold supervised and managed all technical interactions
between Bigelow Aerospace and ISC Kosmotras, which took place in Dnepropetrovsk,
Ukraine, Moscow and Yasny, Russia. The author would like to thank Robert T. Bigelow for
his vision and ongoing support, his wife Meredith for her patience and help during long hours
at home and continuing absences abroad, and his toddler son Darron; it is for him that we are
trying to build a better and more peaceful world.
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under the auspices of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”)1 those
in the aerospace workforce have unwittingly surrendered their First Amendment
rights to free speech. This article will describe how the Ninth Circuit case of
Bernstein v. U.S. Department of Justice2 clearly demonstrates the unconstitutional
nature of the ITAR and will recommend reforms that would bring America’s export
control regime back into line with the nation’s founding principles.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICA’S AEROSPACE EXPORT CONTROL REGIME AND ITS
PERNICIOUS ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES3
In the 1980s, the commercial space field was still in its infancy. Commercial
launches were few and infrequent, and revenues were low.4 During this period,
space systems, such as satellites, were controlled by the Department of State and,
just as they are now, were under the auspices of the ITAR.5 However, toward the
end of the decade, when the field began to blossom, permission was given to expand
launch opportunities overseas.6 For example, in 1988, the Reagan Administration
approved the sale and launch of communications satellites to China to be placed into
orbit over the course of nine launches.7
By the early 1990s, the export control regime for commercial satellites was
further liberalized.8 Under the first President Bush, dual-use items, including some
telecommunication satellites, were removed from the United States Munitions List
(“USML”).9 Jurisdiction over these systems was similarly transferred from the
Department of State to the Department of Commerce.10 Although this was certainly
a positive change, the U.S. export control regime was already on the verge of
obsolescence. Part of the reason the transfer from State to Commerce took place was
that the U.S. had become the only nation that still treated commercial
telecommunication satellites as munitions.11
1

22 C.F.R. § 120.11 (2009).

2

Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Bernstein].

3

Much of the history provided below was previously described in Mike N. Gold, Lost In
Space: A Practitioner’s First-Hand Perspective on Reforming the U.S.’s Obsolete, Arrogant,
and Counterproductive Export Control Regime for Space-Related Systems and Technologies,
34 J. SPACE L. 163 (2008) (exploring in detail the author’s export control experiences on
Bigelow Aerospace’s Genesis I and II launch campaigns, as well as commonsense ideas for
reform).
4

FAA, Commercial Space Historical Launch Data, http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/ast/launch_data/historical_launch/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2009).
5
Ryan Zelnio, A Short History of Export Control Policy, SPACE REV., Jan. 9, 2006,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/528/1.
6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id.
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By 1996 under President Clinton, after some internal governmental debate,
export control jurisdiction for all communication satellites (“commsats”) was
transferred away from State and placed exclusively under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Commerce.12
However, Commerce’s purview over commsats was soon undone by events that
had occurred even before Commerce had assumed regulatory control. In 1995 and
1996, China suffered two Long March rocket failures.13 The ill-fated Long March
rockets carried, respectively, commsats produced by Hughes and Loral.14
Subsequently, both Hughes and Loral produced launch failure analyses that were
required for insurance purposes. The Department of Commerce approved the full
transfer of this information to the Chinese and the insurers under the auspices of a
previous license granted in 1994.15 This move created a great deal of controversy
and resulted in the following situation, best described below in an excerpt from The
Space Review:
This analysis created a major controversy, as it was unclear whether
Commerce had the authority to approve such an export. A congressional
review determined that these launch failure reviews were conducted
without required Department of State export licenses, and communicated
technical information to the PRC in violation of ITAR. This investigation
led to the inclusion of a provision in the Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act in 1998 in that [it] returned control of all
satellites and related technologies to the Department of State. This was
accomplished by the removal of said items from the Commerce list of
dual-use items in the Export Administration Regulations and placing them
on the State Department’s United States Munitions List, controlled under
section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act. In addition, a provision was
added that the President must certify to Congress 15 days in advance that
any transfer of satellite technology to China would not harm US launch
companies and/or help Chinese missile technology.16
Under pressure from the then GOP-controlled Congress,17 the Clinton
Administration was essentially forced to accept a Department of State regime that
placed all space-related equipment and hardware on the USML, bringing space
technology exclusively under the auspices of the ITAR.
Not only was this overly broad implementation of the ITAR unconstitutional, but
it has done substantial damage to the nation’s economy and, counter-intuitively, to
national security.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Taylor Dinerman, Fixing ITAR: The Saga Continues, SPACE REV., May 16, 2005,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/374/1.
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In regard to economics, America was once the world’s only commercial space
launch provider. However, over the span of several decades, America has gone from
being number one to conducting only one commercial space launch in 2006.18
Domestic launch companies have become so lazy and bloated that only the U.S.
government can afford their services. If the government were to stop purchasing
U.S. rockets, or open their contracts up to foreign competition, the American launch
industry as we know it would most likely cease to exist.19
In stark contrast, the foreign aerospace sector is booming. For example, Russian
rockets accounted for twelve commercial launches in 2007, more than half of all
commercial launches in the year, and double that of their closest competitor, the
European Ariane system, which was responsible for six commercial launches in
2007.20
How much America’s backward export control regime has influenced the U.S.’s
downward spiral in commercial space launch is arguable, although it would be
impossible to contend that it has not been a contributing factor to today’s dismal
situation.21 However, where the harm done by ITAR is probably most keenly felt is
in the U.S. satellite manufacturing industry. Since all space hardware was moved to
ITAR/the USML in 1999, the once dominant American commsat manufacturing
sector has seen its share of the global market drop from a strong 83% to a soft 50%.22
European competitors such as Alcatel Alenia (which explicitly advertises an ‘ITARFree’ satellite) have doubled their market share23 while U.S. entities, particularly
small and medium sized businesses, are withdrawing from international contracts.24
In the meantime, China, one of the primary countries that ITAR was intended to
keep advanced space technology away from, has of course continued to purchase
state-of-the art hardware from European, Russian, and Israeli suppliers, costing U.S.
companies as much as $6 billion since 1999 in Chinese-related business alone.25

18

FAA, supra note 4.

19
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, BRIEFING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE
HEALTH OF THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRY BASE AND THE IMPACT OF EXPORT CONTROLS 7 (2008),
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021908_csis_spaceindustryitar_final.pdf (“The U.S. space
industrial base is largely dependent on the U.S. defense/national security budget.”).
20

Futron, Monthly Launch Report January 2008, http://www.futron.com/pdf/
friends_of_futron_reports/launch_reports/FutronLR2008-01.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
21

Dinerman, supra note 17.

22

Ryan Zelnio, The Effects of Export Control on the Space Industry, SPACE REV., Jan. 16,
2006, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/533/1 [hereinafter Zelnio, Effects of Export
Control].
23

Id. (“By far the greatest benefactor to US export policies has been Alcatel Alenia Space,
a joint venture formed in 2005 by combining the space businesses of Alcatel and
Finmeccanica. In the early 2000s, Alcatel announced that they would create an ‘ITAR-free’
spacecraft. By 2004, Alcatel had been able to double their market share from around 10% in
1998 to over 20% in 2004.”).
24

CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, supra note 19, at 10.

25

Zelnio, Effects of Export Control, supra note 22.
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Under both the Bush and Clinton Administrations, over 700,000 scientific and
technical aerospace jobs have been lost.26 By further aggravating an already
deplorable situation, America’s economically nonsensical export control regime has
become the equivalent of committing industrial suicide. However, what is arguably
even worse than shipping jobs and industries overseas is the threat that the ITAR
poses to our own national security.
Specifically, not only does the ITAR as it is currently being implemented fail to
achieve its primary goal27 of preserving critical U.S. military technological
advantages, 28 but it is actually weakening our domestic defense capabilities. For
example, by emasculating America’s domestic satellite manufacturing market,
thereby sending billions of dollars and thousand of jobs overseas, even the
Department of Defense is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign components.
In the same vein, domestic aerospace companies are now nearly entirely dependent
on government support29—an untenable and dangerous situation. Companies that
have the government as their primary or exclusive customer ultimately become
bloated, prohibitively expensive leviathans, unable to innovate or tackle real
competition. Most innovation comes from smaller commercial second and third tier
suppliers, and these are the entities that suffer the most under the ITAR.30 Finally,
by encouraging, and in some instances forcing, other nations to develop native
capabilities, the ITAR is fueling proliferation.31 For all of these reasons, many

26

COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, FINAL REPORT, xv, 4-5
(Nov. 2002), http://trade.gov/static/aero_rpt_aero_commission.pdf.
27
For a brief description of the theoretical purpose of the U.S. ITAR regime, see the
explanation given on the Defense Technology Security Administration (“DTSA”) homepage
at http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/dtsa/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
28
“There are rapidly emerging foreign space capabilities and the U.S. does not control
their proliferation.” CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, supra note 19, at 8. “The current
export control policy has not prevented the rise of foreign space capabilities and in some cases
has encouraged it (ITAR-free space products).” Id.
29
“The U.S. space industrial base is largely dependent on the U.S. defense/national
security budget.” Id. at 7.
30

“The results also indicated that smaller respondent companies are more likely to feel
adverse effects from ITAR than large companies. This is a matter of some concern, as lowertier contractors are a significant source of the new technology and innovation that enables the
United States to remain a world leader in space. By continuing to operate an export control
regime designed during the Cold War, the United States reduces the competitiveness of its
space industry in the global market and potentially harms the domestic innovation processes
that enable U.S. space leadership.” SPACE FOUNDATION, ITAR AND THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRY
1 (Sept. 2008).
31
“You may think that [export control] is the price of security but Lon Rains, the editor of
Space News, says that ITAR has ‘sped up the inevitable proliferation of advanced technology,
by forcing countries to find other means of obtaining satellite components that had previously
been manufactured only in the United States.’” Earthbound; Space Technology, ECONOMIST,
August 23, 2008, at 66.
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national security experts are now advocating ITAR reform.32 The traditional policy
debate in Washington is “liberty” versus “security.” The ITAR presents no such
dilemma since it damages both.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE ITAR
A. Bernstein versus the Departments of State and Commerce
1. Background
Unfortunately, statutes cannot be struck down because they are obsolete or
nonsensical.33 The Constitution never promised competent government; but,
recognizing the fallibility of mortal leadership, the Founding Fathers wisely
established fundamental liberties as ensconced in the Bill of Rights. It is the first and
arguably most cherished right34—our freedom of expression—that the ITAR so
blatantly violates.
This fact was demonstrated in the landmark case of Bernstein v. U.S. Department
of Justice.35 Like most good technology stories, the Bernstein case begins with a
graduate student. Daniel J. Bernstein was working as a doctoral candidate at the
University of California, Berkeley, where he developed an encryption method.

32

See, e.g., Colin Clark, U.S. Eyes Removing Some Satellite Components from Munitions
List, SPACE NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/080407-busmonsatellite-remove.html.
33

For example, it is still illegal in Minnesota to cross the state line with a duck on top of
one’s head. Dumblaws.com, Dumb Laws in Minnesota, http://www.dumblaws.com/laws/
united-states/minnesota (last visited Aug. 26, 2009). Although this law may sound ridiculous,
it should be noted that it has done much less damage to the American economy and national
security than the ITAR, and I understand the ducks are quite happy with it.
34

The First Amendment was actually almost the third Amendment:
Some people say the rights protected by the First Amendment are the most important
in the entire Bill of Rights, because they are listed before the other nine amendments.
However, in the original version of the Bill of Rights, what is now the First
Amendment came third—after proposed amendments on reapportionment and
congressional pay raises. The states failed to ratify these amendments, moving the
third amendment into first place. Whatever its order in the original Bill of Rights, the
First Amendment includes the rights many Americans hold most dear, and it forms the
foundation of American democratic government. The five freedoms listed in the First
Amendment—religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition—enable citizens to
participate in the process of self-government. Together, these five rights are
sometimes referred to as freedom of expression. Because the First Amendment
protects the expression of deep convictions, it can also expose deep differences among
the American people. Thus, the First Amendment is often at the center of the nation’s
most contentious debates. Without the freedoms in the First Amendment, it would be
impossible for Americans to assert any other rights they have, thus making it the most
important amendment in the Bill of Rights.
National Constitution Center, Interactive Constitution http://72.32.50.200/constitution/
details_explanation.php?link=120&const=08_amd_01. (quoting LINDA R. MONK, THE WORDS
WE LIVE BY: YOUR ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 127 (2003)).
35

Bernstein, 176 F.3d 1132.
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Specifically, Bernstein created “a zero-delay private-key stream encryptor based
upon a one-way hash function.”36 Despite how easily this description rolls off of the
tongue, Bernstein dubbed his creation “Snuffle.”37
Bernstein was quite proud of Snuffle and sought to present his work to relevant
academics and scientists.38 Before doing so, Bernstein queried the State Department
to determine if he would need a license to publish Snuffle.39 To Bernstein’s surprise,
he was informed by the Department of State that Snuffle was a “munition” and that
under the ITAR40 a license would most definitely be required in order to “export”
Snuffle.41 From this point followed what the Ninth Circuit Court described as an
“unproductive” series of communications between Bernstein and the Department of
State, wherein “Bernstein unsuccessfully attempted to determine the scope and
Fellow export control
application of the export regulations to Snuffle.”42
practitioners know all too well what such “unproductive” conversations can be like.
After experiencing the full force of the State’s bureaucracy, Bernstein filed legal
action challenging the constitutionality of the ITAR.43
Bernstein’s desire to seek refuge from the Department of State in the judiciary
proved fruitful, and in 1996, the district court granted summary judgment in his favor
and found that the ITAR was facially invalid as a prior restraint on speech and
therefore violated Bernstein’s First Amendment rights.44 However, as described
previously, in 1996 President Clinton shifted the relevant regulatory authority to the
Department of Commerce,45 and this move included both commercial satellites and
cryptography. Bernstein then found himself under the Export Administration
Regulations (“EAR”) as administered by the Bureau of Export Administration
(“BXA”).46 Unlike most of us in the aerospace industry who would be ecstatic to see
control of commsats and related technology shifted back to Commerce, Bernstein
continued to assert his constitutional freedoms, and despite the relative advantages of
working with Commerce in lieu of the State, amended his complaint to include
Commerce and its constituent entities. Following the rationale of the previous
decision, the district court again granted Bernstein summary judgment finding the
EAR facially invalid as a prior restraint on speech.47 The district court subsequently
36

Id. at 1135.

37

Id at 1136.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-130.17 (2009).

41

Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1136.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

45

Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products, Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61
Fed. Reg. 58,767 (Nov. 15, 1996).
46

Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293-94 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

47

Id. at 1310.
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issued an injunction against enforcement of the invalidated EAR provisions.48 The
Government appealed the decision of the district court, and the case went before the
Ninth Circuit for review.49
2. Ninth Circuit Opinion
In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit focused exclusively on the issue of prior restraint.
Specifically, the issue was whether the EAR restrictions constituted prior restraint in
violation of the First Amendment.50 The court began by noting the critical nature of
prior restraint on speech: “prior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”51 Due to the
paramount importance of this right, the court stated that the export control
regulations faced a difficult burden, explaining that “[a]ny prior restraint on
expression comes . . . with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional
validity.”52
In terms of its analysis, the court followed the model set by the Supreme Court
by addressing the issue in two parts: first, the threshold question of Bernstein’s
ability to bring a facial attack against the export control regulations; and second,
whether the regulations constituted an impermissible prior restraint on speech.53
a. Facial Attack
In regard to the first issue, the court began by reiterating the precedent that a
licensing regime is always subject to facial challenges as a prior restraint where it (1)
“gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on
the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked
speakers,” and, (2) has “a close enough nexus to expression, or to conduct commonly
associated with expression, to pose a real and substantial threat of . . . censorship
risks.”54
The court found that the first part of this test was easily satisfied, citing the fact
that BXA administrators were “empowered to deny licenses whenever export might
be inconsistent with ‘U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.’”55 Such
vague guidance was found by the court to be “little better than no constraint at all.”56
The court upheld the contention that export control regulations that simply allow
Government officials to rule in favor of the general public interest are “illusory” and
“renders the guarantee against censorship little more than a high-sounding ideal.”57
48

Id. at 1310-11.

49

Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1132.

50

Id. at 1138.

51

Id. (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)).

52

Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).

53

Id. at 1139.

54

Id. (quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988)).

55

Id. (citing to 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b) (1999)).

56

Id.

57

Id. (citing Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 769-70).
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Moreover, the court dismissed the Government’s argument that BXA Administrators
would not discriminate on the basis of content as being “beside the point,”58 citing
the fact that the concept that officials will act in good faith “is the very presumption
that the doctrine forbidding unbridled discretion disallows,”59 and that “the mere
existence of the licensor’s unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of prior
restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion
and power are never actually abused.”60 For all of these reasons, the court found that
the EAR gave BXA officials substantial power to discriminate, easily satisfying the
first requirement for making a facial attack.61
The second requirement was a more difficult issue for the Ninth Circuit since it
was forced to determine if Snuffle source code represented free speech.62 However,
after a great deal of discussion and analysis, the court held that it did. The opinion
stated that cryptographers use source code to express their ideas “in much the same
way that mathematicians use equations or economists use graphs” and therefore
encryption software, and even its source code, “must be viewed as expressive for
First Amendment purposes and thus is entitled to the protection of the prior restraint
doctrine.”63
b. Are the Export Control Regulations an Impermissible Prior Restraint?
With Bernstein’s ability to bring a facial attack against the relevant export control
regulations firmly established, the court went on to examine the issue of whether the
regulations created an impermissible prior restraint. The court began its analysis by
again referencing the “heavy presumption” against prior restraints but described how
even such a strong presumption can be overcome where official discretion is
bounded by stringent procedural safeguards.64 More specifically, the court laid out
three criteria for evaluating the validity of export control licensing schemes: “(1) any
restraint must be for a specified brief period of time; (2) there must be expeditious
judicial review; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress
the speech in question and must bear the burden of proof.”65
In regard to the first criteria—timing—the court found that the EAR’s
requirement that any license application be resolved or referred to the President
within 90 days was essentially meaningless since, once a license was referred to the
President, no time limit applies.66 Next, the court noted that the EAR denied
licensing applicants the opportunity for judicial review67 and therefore failed to meet
58

Id.

59

Id. (quoting Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770).

60

Id. (quoting Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757).

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 1141.

64

Id. at 1143-44 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990)).

65

Id. at 1144.

66

Id.

67

15 C.F.R. § 756.2(c)(2) (2009).
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the second criteria for a valid licensing regime. Because the EAR failed the first two
criteria, the court did not see the need to address the third part of the analysis, and
therefore, concluded that the EAR represented an impermissible prior restraint.68
Having established Bernstein’s ability to make a facial attack against the EAR,
and that the EAR clearly created an impermissible prior restraint, the court held that:
[T]he challenged regulations allow the government to restrain speech
indefinitely with no clear criteria for review. As a result, Bernstein and
other scientists have been effectively chilled from engaging in valuable
scientific expression. Bernstein’s experience itself demonstrates the
enormous uncertainty that exists over the scope of the regulations and the
potential for the chilling of scientific expression. In short, because the
challenged regulations grant boundless discretion to government officials,
and because they lack the required procedural protections set forth in the
Freedman, we find that they operate as an unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech.69
B. Applying Bernstein to ITAR and the Aerospace Field
1. General Applicability
In the aerospace industry, the EAR is unanimously viewed as a much less
pernicious regime than that of the ITAR.70 The Bernstein precedent is particularly
relevant to the aerospace field because the ITAR actually represents a more
egregious violation of First Amendment rights than the EAR. For the purpose of
analysis, we will use a relatively simple hypothetical example of a private Japanese
citizen wishing to become a passenger aboard a commercial space launch system.
Whether the space launch system is orbital or suborbital, since it is a “spacecraft”
and literally all spacecraft fall under Category XV of the ITAR, a license must be
procured from the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
(“DDTC”) prior to a foreign national, such as our hypothetical Japanese customer,
from receiving any written or verbal instructions in regard to being a spaceflight
passenger, being allowed inside the space launch vehicle, or, for that matter, even
seeing the outside of the rocket and/or capsule. Like Bernstein in the early 1990s,
aerospace employees today may not be allowed to express even superficial aspects of
their work, ideas, and technologies, until they receive permission from the U.S.
68

Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1144-45.

69

Id. at 1145.

70

The GOP-controlled Congress brought intense pressure to bear on the Clinton
Administration to tighten up export controls, and forced the shift of final authority for
space products from the Commerce Department to the State Department. Almost
immediately the US industry felt the effects. Exporters soon discovered that there was
a new sheriff in town and that he had a mean streak. Foreign governments and
companies which had long-established relationships with American companies faced
new, and unexpected, sets of obstacles to doing business with America. Unlike the
days of the COCOM, where the rules were well understood and there was a sense,
however tenuous, of solidarity, allies such as Britain and Canada found themselves
being treated in the same way as Russia and China.
Dinerman, supra note 17.
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Department of State. The ITAR represents a blatant example of unconstitutional
prior restraint, a fact easily born out when the legal analysis utilized by the Ninth
Circuit in the Bernstein case is applied to our hypothetical Japanese astronaut.
As in Bernstein, there are two threshold issues: (1) the ability of the offended
aerospace officials to make a facial attack against the ITAR; and (2) if the ITAR
represents an impermissible prior restraint on speech.71
2. Facial Attack
Per Bernstein, there are, again, two criteria for being able to make a facial attack
against the ITAR: (1) does the government have substantial power to discriminate
based on content or dislike of the speaker; and (2) is there a sufficient nexus to
expression creating a censorship risk. 72 The answer to both is a resounding yes. The
court ruled in favor of Bernstein on this point since the BXA officials enforcing the
EAR were empowered to deny licenses whenever export might be inconsistent with
“U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.”73 Similarly, after listing out
several “rogue” nations that are prohibited from receiving USML exports entirely
(e.g., Cuba, Iran, North Korea, etc.), the ITAR simply states that the DDTC may
reject a license “whenever an export would not otherwise be in furtherance of world
peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States.”74 As in the Bernstein
case, the ITAR provides a level of specificity usually only reserved for beauty
pageant Q&As. There can be no question that the ITAR’s vague references to
“world peace” and the U.S.’s “foreign policy interests” are entirely insufficient to
prevent potential discrimination and/or abuse.
As was the case in Bernstein, the second part of the test—establishing a nexus to
expression—is more difficult to determine, but still easily answered in the
affirmative. Simply put, if a cryptographic code could be seen as expressive for
purposes of the First Amendment, it is difficult to imagine that instructions related to
being a passenger on board a private sector space launch system would not be
viewed similarly. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that the Snuffle source code
represented a way to express Bernstein’s scientific ideas. Similarly, instructions
about being a passenger aboard a rocket and exposure to the space travel experience
is a means of aerospace engineers and entrepreneurs expressing their ideas.
Additionally, even if the instructions and superficial exposure of hardware by
aerospace companies to international customers are viewed as purely commercial
speech, such speech still demands protection under the First Amendment.75 To
determine the ability of the Government to regulate commercial speech, a four
pronged test is generally utilized: (1) the speech must not be misleading or related to
unlawful activity; (2) the government must have a substantial interest in regulating
71

Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1144.
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Id. at 1139 (quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988)).
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15 C.F.R. § 742.15 (2009).
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22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a) (2009).
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See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment protects the right of a company to
disseminate information and the public to receive it, so long as such information is truthful and
not misleading).
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the speech; (3) the regulation must directly serve that substantial interest; and (4) the
regulation must be no more extensive than necessary.76 In the case of our hopeful
Japanese space tourist and the ITAR, all of these criteria are met.
First, the instructions the tourist will receive will be both truthful and lawful;
therefore, the aerospace company meets its part of the test. In contrast, the
Government fails to achieve any of its three criteria. Specifically, the Government
does not have a substantial interest in regulating the speech and the regulation does
not directly serve a substantial governmental interest. Preventing the Japanese
tourist from being exposed to the inside and outside of a rocket and capsule does not
serve a substantial governmental interest. As a matter of fact, just the opposite is
true; the Government has a substantial interest in seeing commercial space develop77
and these regulations are an anathema to the birth and health of such an industry.
Moreover, the regulations do not directly serve a substantial governmental
interest, since sending the jobs and revenue created by the commercial spaceflight
industry overseas is, again, counter to the Government’s overriding interests.
Finally, the regulations are far more extensive than necessary. The over-breadth
of the ITAR is what has created such a problematic situation in the first place. No
one would argue, particularly in the aerospace industry, that there are not
technologies worth protecting. There are numerous examples of ballistic missile
components that should not be shared with foreign nationals without first undergoing
a rigorous review process. However, the all-encompassing ITAR takes this too far
and creates a prior restraint against virtually all aerospace related information and
hardware, no matter how benign. Our hypothetical (and by now, very frustrated)
Japanese space tourist who is covered by the ITAR is an example of its overly broad
nature. Assuming the Japanese tourist is neither going to fly nor operate the rocket,
it is difficult to imagine what possible national security interest is served by not
allowing the customer on board. I have flown on more Southwest Airline flights
than I can count; however, I still can’t build a 737. There is no substantive technical
data transferred by being a passenger inside a space launch vehicle, and no
substantial governmental interest is served in this case by the ITAR’s overly broad
prior restraint, directly or otherwise. Therefore, the ITAR fails all of the relevant
criteria, and even if the information provided to the Japanese space tourist is viewed
as purely commercial speech, it is still most definitely a form of expression protected
by the First Amendment.
Also, in the Bernstein case, the Ninth Circuit sought to defend scientific
expression and progress,78 and this is certainly relevant to our hypothetical situation.
Space travel itself is inherently scientific in nature.79 Adding to our hypothetical, let
76
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
77

For example, “[t]he Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States
requires that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (as established by subchapter
II of this chapter) seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial
use of space.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2451(c) (West 2005).
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Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1145-47.
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A new manned spaceflight program would do a lot to restore public enthusiasm for
space and for science generally. Robotic missions are much cheaper and may provide
more scientific information, but they don’t catch the public imagination in the same
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us say that the Japanese traveler is a scientist wishing to conduct a microgravity
experiment that he built for his university project researching new cancer drugs. In
this situation, we see where the very purpose of the speech by the aerospace
company—exposure to the space launch vehicle and instructions on how to safely
act as a passenger—are key aspects in pursuit of scientific knowledge. If the
aerospace information described in our hypothetical is placed under the prior
restraint of the ITAR, it will most certainly prevent the expression of scientific
concepts and lead to the self-censorship feared by the Bernstein court.80
3. Impermissible Prior Restraint on Speech
Since the ITAR’s vague guidelines create substantial opportunities for abuse, and
since providing instructions and information to our hypothetical Japanese space
passenger represents protected commercial and/or scientific speech, the next
question at issue is whether the ITAR represents an impermissible prior restraint.
Per Bernstein, to survive, the ITAR must address the following criteria: (1) any
restraint must be for a specified brief period of time; (2) there must be expeditious
judicial review; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress
the speech in question and must bear the burden of proof.81
The ITAR easily fails the first point since there are no mandatory deadlines for
any activity. Theoretically, the DDTC can take an infinite amount of time to act on a
license or commodity jurisdiction request without repercussion.82
Additionally, the ITAR also fails the second criteria, since no judicial review is
available, expeditious or otherwise, due to the ITAR’s exemption from the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).83
As in Bernstein,84 because the ITAR fails the first two parts of the analysis, there
is no need to address the third point. Therefore, the ITAR clearly represents an
impermissible prior restraint.
way, and they don’t spread the human race into space, which I argue should be our
long-term strategy. A goal of a base on the Moon by 2020 and of a man landing on
Mars by 2025 would reignite a space program and give it a sense of purpose in the
same way that President Kennedy’s Moon target did in the 1960s. A new interest in
space would also increase the public standing of science generally. The low esteem in
which science and scientists are held is having serious consequences. We live in a
society that is increasingly governed by science and technology, yet fewer and fewer
young people long to go into science.
Stephen Hawking, The Final Frontier, COSMOS, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.cosmosmagazine.
com /node/2209/full.
80
Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1139. As a matter of fact, self-censorship has already become a
common part of everyday life in the aerospace field.
81

Id. at 1144.
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One of the lessons the author has learned as a new father is that the gestation period for
a human being is far less than that of a Commodity Jurisdiction (“CJ”) request. Specifically,
Bigelow Aerospace filed a CJ request in December of 2007 and still has not received a
response from the DDTC.
83

“Because the exercising of the foreign affairs function, including the decisions required
to implement the Arms Export Control Act, is highly discretionary, it is excluded from review
under the Administrative Procedures Act.” Exclusion of functions from the Administrative
Procedures Act, 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2009).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: FIXING THE ITAR
As described above, since the ITAR is vulnerable to facial attack and represents
an impermissible prior restraint of free expression, like the relevant EAR provisions
in Bernstein,85 the regulations can and likely would be struck down if an appropriate
suit were filed. However, bringing the ITAR into line with the First Amendment—
while taking some effort—would not be extraordinarily difficult to accomplish. The
judicial analysis in Bernstein itself provides a roadmap for the necessary reforms.
First and foremost, hard deadlines must be established for license applications,
commodity jurisdiction requests, and other relevant activities. This would not only
provide substantial relief to companies who need to plan schedules, but would
address the first part of the impermissible prior restraint analysis. National Security
Presidential Directive 5686 was touted as the first step toward providing the DDTC
with the personnel and resources necessary to support timely action. Assuming this
occurs, the next logical step will be to establish desperately needed hard deadlines.
Additionally, the ITAR’s exemption to the APA should be removed or
substantially revised. Expeditious judicial review must become a part of the ITAR in
order for it to pass Constitutional muster. If the ITAR were revised to provide for
such judicial review, the second part of the impermissible prior restraint analysis
would also be resolved.
Finally, the United States Munitions List (“USML”) must be reviewed and
revised. Currently, there are numerous systems and technologies that should not be
on the USML (and, conversely, some that are on the Commerce Control List and
should instead be on the USML). A rapid yet comprehensive review should be
conducted to ensure that we are protecting systems that need it and are not burdening
industry with superfluous protections for technologies that are either obsolete or
widely available in the international marketplace. If this were done and the ITAR’s
shockingly vague “world peace” language were removed, the ITAR might no longer
be open to facial attacks. Moreover, such a commonsense export control regime
would also protect the U.S. from physical attacks, since, if the USML were revised,
the Government could apply its limited resources exclusively to militarily sensitive
technologies that warrant enhanced scrutiny and stop wasting time with items that
are either obsolete or commonly available in the international marketplace. At a
Center for Strategic and International Studies conference on export control, one
former industry executive summed the situation up quite well by reminding the

84

Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1144.

85

Id. at 1147.
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On January 22, 2008, the President signed Nation Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD) – 56. The directive mandated a series of reforms in the way defense trade is
executed by the executive branch to enhance transparency, timeliness and
predictability for industry. These reforms included the process and management
improvements, as well as a requirement that DDTC be fully resourced to perform its
mission. It also mandated that DDTC’s mission be 75 percent “self-funded.”
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), U.S. Department of State, http://pmd
dtc.state.gov/registration/faqs.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
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audience that, “if you protect your toothbrushes as much as your diamonds, you’re
going to lose a lot more diamonds than toothbrushes.”87
V. CONCLUSION: A REVOLUTION THAT MUST TAKE PLACE
It is ironic that one of the primary goals of aerospace is to defend American
freedom, yet, the industry seems unaware and unwilling to defend its own
constitutional rights. The fixes described above would not only serve a strong
constitutional interest but would help both American commerce and U.S. national
security. It is rare that such a trifecta of positive outcomes exist and demonstrates
just how counterproductive the ITAR is in a variety of contexts.
The ITAR seems strong and threatening, but, like a common school yard bully,
all it will take is for one person to stand up against it to render the regulations
impotent. If anything, the Bernstein analysis demonstrates that the ITAR is even
more vulnerable to constitutional scrutiny than the EAR, and such vulnerability begs
to be exploited.
The ITAR is threatening our national security and destroying American
commerce and competitiveness, yet the industry does nothing. We have collectively
paid billions of dollars in fines and fees, wasted a decade on unwarranted
bureaucracy, and yet we are too afraid to take action. The architect of American
liberty, Thomas Paine, once said, “the strength and power of despotism consists
wholly in the fear of resistance.” The Bernstein case shows that not only is
resistance against the ITAR the moral path forward, but, as is always the case, liberty
and victory will walk that path together.

87
This statement was made at the conference, information about which is available at
CSIS, Toward a 21st Century Export and Technology Control Regime, (May 15, 2008),
http://tinyurl.com/my55bv.
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